We analyze the consequences of strategically sophisticated bidding without assuming equilibrium behavior. In particular, we characterize interim rationalizable bids in symmetric first-price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals. We show that (1) every non-zero bid below the equilibrium is rationalizable, (2) some bids above the equilibrium are rationalizable, (3) the upper bound on rationalizable bids of a given player is a nondecreasing function of her signal. In the special case of independent signals and quasi-linear valuation functions, (i) the least upper bound on rationalizable bids is concave; hence (ii) rationalizability implies substantial proportional shading for high valuations, but is consistent with negligible proportinal shading for low valuations. We argue that our theoretical analysis may shed some light on experimental findings about deviations from the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The analysis of simultaneous bidding games generally builds upon the notion of (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. Implicit in the latter solution concept are the assumptions that players are rational and hold correct beliefs about the play of their opponents.
This paper represents a first step toward the analysis of simultaneous bidding games under the assumption that bidders' beliefs are strategically sophisticated, but not necessarily correct; the rationality hypothesis is maintained.
Strategic sophistication is defined as the conjunction of the following assumptions about beliefs: (1) Bidders expect positive bids to win with positive probability; (2) Bidders are certain that their opponents are rational and certain of (1); (3) Bidders are certain that their opponents are certain of (2); and so on.
We focus on first-price sealed-bid auctions with private or interdependent valuations and independent or correlated signals, and adopt the notion of (interim) rationalizability to capture strategic sophistication.
Our approach is motivated by the following considerations. In our opinion, the equilibrium assumption that beliefs are correct should be justified in terms of more fundamental hypotheses about the bidders' belief formation process. In particular, one may attempt to find a justification based on either introspection or learning in the specific context of auction games.
This paper provides an analysis based on beliefs that are strategically sophisticated, and hence consistent with a careful introspective analysis of the game. We show that, in first-price auctions, although strategic sophistication has non-trivial implications for bidding behavior, it is consistent with a wide range of non-equilibrium beliefs. Thus, introspection alone does not provide a justification for equilibrium analysis.
One may then argue that, even if bidders initially hold heterogeneous non-equilibrium beliefs, a learning process should nevertheless lead to an equilibrium.
1
This argument, however, is subject to important qualifications. First, it applies only to situations where bidders repeatedly play similar auction games with different competitors (a fixed set of bidders could give rise to collusion). Second, whether convergence to an equilibrium occurs at all, as well as the speed of convergence, crucially depend on how much feedback each player obtains about the decision rules adopted by his competitors in previous plays. In auctions games, this feedback is typically very poor: only the actual bids, and not the private information that induced such bids, can typically be observed.
2 Therefore, we find no compelling reasons to expect approximate equilibrium behavior in the short run. Not surprisingly, experimental evidence shows significant and persistent Our main technical contribution is to provide a more efficient implementation of interim rationalizability in the setting under consideration. The methodology we propose entails constructing bounds on the set of rational(izable) bids for a given type (valuation, signal) then proving that every bid within these bounds is rational(izable).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the steps of our analysis, as well as the main ideas, by means of an example. Section 3 introduces our basic characterization result for symmetric auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals. This result is used in Section 4 to obtain an iterative characterization of interim rationalizable bids in auctions. Section 5 discusses the relationship with experimental evidence and some extensions of our results. The Appendix contains some proofs and ancillary results.
An Illustration: the two-bidder uniform IPV case
In order to develop the main ideas, we consider the following simple setting: two bidders (denoted i = 1, 2) participate in the auction; each bidder's valuation is fully determined by an independent draw s i from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We reserve boldface letters for random variables, and italics for their realizations. Bidders are risk-neutral: thus, if Bidder i wins the object for a price $b when her valuation is s i = s i , her payoff equals s i − b.
A bidding function is a map b : [0, 1] → R + . Recall that, in this setting, there exists a unique, symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, characterized by the bidding function
To simplify the exposition, throughout this section we assume that a bidder's conjecture about her opponent's behavior may be represented by a continuous, increasing 4 bidding function (these restrictions are relaxed in the main text). In light of our distributional assumptions, the expected payoff to Bidder i when her type is s i , her conjecture is b j , and she bids b ∈ [b j (0),
The first objective of this paper is to characterize bids that survive finitely many steps of interim rationalizability, under the additional assumption that (it is common belief that) bidders expect positive bids to win with positive probability. The set of bids for type s i that survive k steps of the procedure is denoted by R(s i ; k).
In the present setting, it turns out that interim rationality, with the additional assumption just indicated, eliminates all weakly dominated bids: thus, if Bidder i's signal is s i > 0, she may only place bids in the interval (0, s i ). A bidder with signal s i = 0 will only bid 0. This is the first step of the procedure, i.e., the characterization of the set of interim 1-rationalizable bids for each bidder: we may write R(s i ; 1) = (0, s i ) for s i ∈ (0, 1] and R(0; 1) = {0}.
The inductive step entails characterizing the sets R(s i ; k) for each s i ∈ [0, 1] and k > 1; by definition, these are the collections of bids that are best responses for Bidder i to conjectures consistent with the following assumptions: (1) positive bids win with positive probability; and (2) for all s j , Bidder j's type s j places bids drawn from the set R(s j ; k − 1).
The inductive step can be understood by focusing on the characterization of the sets R(s i ; 2), s i > 0. Note that, for k = 2, (2) actually implies (1); moreover, if Bidder i's beliefs about Bidder j are represented by the bidding function b j , (2) requires that, for (almost) all s j ∈ [0, 1],
That is, Bidder i's belief (for any given signal) must be a positive function below the least upper bound B(s j ; 1) = s j .
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It is plausible to conjecture that the sets R(s i ; 2) will also be intervals of the form (0, B(s i , 2)). Our task is then to derive a new least upper bound B(·; 2) from the preceding one, i.e. B(·; 1). If successful, this approach generalizes to all finite iterations.
We now verify that this conjecture is correct, and derive the new least upper bound. Specifically, we first show that the "old" least upper bound may be used to construct an upper bound on the set of interim 2-rationalizable bids; then, we show that this upper bound is tight, i.e. that every positive bid below this new upper bound is interim 2-rationalizable.
The first key step is to note that the "old" least upper bound B(·; 1), viewed as a conjecture that Bidder i holds about Bidder j, is "more pessimistic" than any conjecture b j that satisfies Eq. (3).
More precisely, suppose that Bidder i's type is s i > 0, and consider any bid b ∈ (0, s i ). Since b < s i , Bidder i strictly prefers to win the object than to lose it. Thus, a conjecture is "more pessimistic" than another if it implies a lower probability of winning, i.e. of placing the highest bid. In particular, if
We will be interested in the maximum expected payoff that Bidder i can secure, given the conjecture B(·; 1):
The unique maximizer is
. On the other hand, notice that, for any conjecture b j and bid
The above observations allow us to place an upper bound on the set of interim 2-rationalizable bids. Suppose that b is such that
, s i ; B(·; 1)). Consider any conjecture b j that satisfies Eq. (3): then
Hence, b cannot be a best reply to a conjecture that satisfies Eq. (3). In other words, the
is an upper bound on the set R(s i ; 2).
We now prove that this upper bound is tight by exhibiting, for any bid b *
Figure 1: The bidding function g b * (L) and the corresponding payoff function for Bidder i (R).
The construction is illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 1 provides the least upper bound on the sets R(s i ; 2); we shall denote it by B(·; 2). The argument above shows that R(s i ; 2) is an interval 7 with interior (0, B(s i ; 2)). The preceding construction did not rely on the specific functional form of the "old" least upper bound B(·; 1), but only on some of its features-specifically, monotonicity and positivity. Thus, the construction can be repeated starting from the bound just derived, i.e. B(·; 2), to conclude that the least upper bound B(·; 3) on the set R(·; 3) is given by
More generally, determining the maximum payoff against a given least upper bound B(·; k−1) is sufficient to pin down the least upper bound B(·; k) on the set of k-rationalizable bids. The set R(s i ; k) is an interval with interior (0, B(s i ; k)).
Thus, the methodology we propose is particularly amenable to numerical computation. Figure 2 shows the first four bounds for the model under consideration; further bounds are not shown because they do not differ significantly from B(·; 4).
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It can be easily proved by induction that B(s i ; k) ≤ B(s i ; k − 1). Therefore the limit B(s i ; ∞) = lim k→∞ B(s i ; k) is well defined. In section 4 we prove that the set of interim rationalizable bids for type s i is an interval with interior (0, B(s i ; ∞)).
To further illustrate our techniques, we sketch an argument showing that, as suggested by Figure 2 , there are rationalizable bids strictly above the Nash equilibrium for almost every type. First note that b eq (s i ) = s i 2 must be rationalizable for type s i because the bidding function b eq is a best reply to itself. Therefore B(s i ; ∞) ≥ b eq (s i ). Since the set of rationalizble bids for s i is an interval with interior (0, B(s i ; ∞)), every bid in the interval (0, b eq (s i )) is rationalizable. This implies that all the best replies to conjectures b j such that 0 < b j (s j ) < b eq (s j ) (for almost all s j ) are rationalizable. The least upper bound on such best replies can be derived from b eq , regarded as a least upper bound on conjectures, using our method:
It is easily verified that
In Section 4 we show that this is a general result. 7 We call "interval" any convex subset of [0, 1] . 8 Details and code are available from the authors upon request. is a non-decreasing and concave function of s i ; also, it lies very close to the 45
• line near the origin. This is not specific to the case k = 2, or indeed to this particular example: our results in Section 4 show that, in all symmetric auctions with independent private values as well as in "generalized wallet games" (cf. Klemperer, 1998) , each bound B(·; k) computed as indicated above has these properties, for all k = 2, ..., ∞. Therefore, rationalizability implies substantial proportional shading (bidding below the valuation) for high types, but is consistent with negligible proportional shading for low types.
Characterizing Best Responses
Consider the following game with asymmetric information representing a single-object, firstprice auction with (possibly) interdependent values and risk-neutral bidders. There are n players, or bidders. Each bidder i observes a random signal with realizations s i in the compact interval S i = [0, 1]. Signals are distributed according to the joint c.d.f. F : S → [0, 1], where S = n i=1 S i . We shall often refer to signals as types. After observing her signal, each player chooses a bid b ≥ 0. The object is assigned to one of the high bidders, breaking ties at random. The winner pays her bid, losers do not pay anything. Bidder i's value for the object is given by a function (random variable) v i : S → R.
Notation
Random variables and beliefs.From the point of view of a bidder, her competitors' bids are random variables. We use boldface letters to denote random variables. A function (random variable) b j : [0, 1] → R + can be interpreted as a conjecture of Player i about the bidding behavior of Player j-a description of how Player j would bid for any possible signal (or type) s j .
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To allow for the possibility that a player is uncertain about the bidding behavior of her competitors, we model beliefs as probability distributions over (n − 1)-tuples of bidding functions (random variables). Let B j denote the jth copy of the set of bounded functions with domain [0, 1] and range R + , interpreted as the set of conjectures about j. The set of possible conjectures for Bidder i about her competitors is B −i = j =i B j . A belief for Player i is a probability measure on B −i , that is, an element µ of the set ∆(B −i ). Conditional expectations and probabilities. The expected value of a random variable x : S → R conditional on realization s i is denoted E[x|s i ] and the expected value of x conditional on s i and event
We need not interpret b j as a bidding strategy chosen ex ante. 10 Our results do not depend on the choice of a specific sigma-algebra of measurable subsets of B −i . We only require that singletons are measurable, so that degenerate beliefs belong to ∆(B −j ).
11 Note that we allow for correlated choices of bidding functions, and hence spurious correlation among opponents' bids. However, the formulation in the text does entail a mild restriction: Player i cannot believe that Player j's bid is a function of the valuation of competitor k.
is the expected valuation for Bidder i conditional on the signal and the event that b is the high bid.
A similar notation is used for conditional probabilities: the probability of event
is the conditional probability that b is the high bid given conjecture b −i .
We shall only need to consider beliefs assigning zero probability to ties. Given such a belief µ ∈ ∆(B −i ), the expected payoff of bidding b conditional on signal s i is
Bid b is a best response to belief µ for type
Assumptions
We assume that the environment is symmetric (cf. Milgrom and Weber, 1982 
Assumption 2 The valuation functions are symmetric: that is, there exists a function
, and permutation {π (2)
For example, in an auction with private values, v(s 1 , s −1 ) = s 1 . In an auction with pure common values, v(s 1 , ..., s n ) is the expected value of the object conditional on the realization (s 1 , ..., s n ).
In the following, we shall drop player indices whenever no confusion can arise.
Assumption 3
The cumulative distribution function F is differentiable, with continuous density f bounded away from zero.
→ R is continuous, increasing in the first argument, and nondecreasing in all the other arguments. Moreover, it satisfies v(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0.
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As a consequence of Assumption 4, the expected valuation conditional on a player's signal is positive:
Remark 1 For each player i and each signal s
We also assume that signals are affiliated. As is well-known from Milgrom and Weber (1982) (MW henceforth) , this is equivalent to the supermodularity of log f . For any pair of vectors (x, y) ∈ R n ×R n let x ∨ y and x ∧ y denote the componentwise maximum and minimum respectively, i.e., x ∨ y = (max(x 1 , y 1 ), ..., max(x n , y n )) and
Clearly, statistical independence is a special case of affiliation. Two key properties of affiliated random variables will be employed here: 
is nondecreasing in each argument. 12 The assumption that v i (0, . . . , 0) = 0 is made for expositional simplicity only. It ensures that, in the symmetric equilibrium constructed in Theorem 14 of Milgrom and Weber (1982) , positive bids win with positive probability; thus, equilibrium bidding functions are admissible conjectures. Our analysis goes through unchanged if one instead assumes that v i is non-negative, and players only expect bids above v i (0, . . . , 0) to win with positive probability (so that, again, equilibrium bidding functions are admissible conjectures).
Upper Bounds on Best Responses
It is often noted that a player bidding close to her expected valuation E[v i |s i ] is subject to the winner's curse, because she is not taking into account the fact that, if she wins the object, it must be the case the competitors have observed low signals. This adverseselection argument relies on the assumption that Player i thinks that her competitors are using increasing bidding functions. To see this, note that if Bidder i has conjecture b −i and b −i is increasing (in each component), then the expected valuation conditional on (the signal and) the event of winning the object We find it interesting to carry out our analysis of strategically sophisticated bidding focusing on beliefs for which the adverse-selection argument mentioned above is valid; therefore, we mainly restrict our attention to beliefs that assign positive weight only to increasing bidding functions
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Also, we shall show that above-equilibrium bids are interim rationalizable for almost all bidder types; in light of the preceding discussion, this conclusion would be uninteresting if we allowed for non-monotonic beliefs.
Formally, let M j denote the set of monotone increasing bidding functions for Player j and let M −i = j =i M j . Then, in our analysis of auctions with interdependent values, we consider beliefs µ ∈ ∆(M −i ). In the special case of private values we consider more general beliefs.
In the same spirit, we wish to avoid the possibility that a player may bid either zero or above her conditional valuation only because she is certain that she is not going to get the object. Therefore we assume that a player believes that every positive bid yields a positive probability of winning the object. Formally, the set of Bidder i's beliefs we restrict our attention to is
where s i on the right hand side is arbitrary.
14 We record two immediate consequences of these restrictions on beliefs.
Remark 2 For any signal s i and conjecture b
Proof. See Lemma 14 in the Appendix.
13 Including nondecreasing bidding functions with flat segments in the support of beliefs involves technical complications that are dealt with in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2000) .
14 By Assumption 3, for every s i , the conditional density f −i|i (·|s i ) is bounded away from zero; hence the expression on the right hand side is independent of s i .
Remark 3 Fix s
Let B −i = {B, B, . . .} be an arbitrary (symmetric) upper bound on the bids of Player i's competitors. The main result of this section characterizes the set of interim best replies to "monotonic" beliefs assigning probability one to bids below this upper bound. The set of such beliefs is
For the special case of private values, where adverse-selection considerations play no role, we are able to characterize best reponses to arbitrary beliefs below the upper bound, i.e., beliefs in the set 
is not a best reply to any belief
and the supremum is attained.
(4) If the auction game has private values
Therefore parts (1) and (2) hold with ∆
Note that, by (3) above and Remark 2, if B is increasing, then inf µ∈∆ 
where
The following proposition lists some useful properties of the map φ, under additional restrictions on the bound B that will be satisfied in our application to rationalizability.
Proposition 8 For every continuous, increasing function B such that B > 0, the function φ B
satisfies the following properties: 
Moreover, consider a signal s i > 0 and the bid function g defined by
Since B is continuous, so is g, and g(0) = 0. Thus,
The proof of (3) and (4) may be found in the Appendix.
Rationalizable Bids
The standard definition of (interim) rationalizability captures the implications of the assumption that bidders are (interim) rational, and there is common certainty of this fact. We analyze a strengthening of this definition because we also assume that bidders' beliefs satisfy some restrictions, and there is common certainty of this fact too (see e.g. Battigalli, 1999) .
Definitions
Let ∆ i ⊆ ∆(B −i ) be a restricted set of beliefs and let ∆ = (∆ 1 , ..., ∆ n ). In particular, we shall consider the case Some additional notation is required. First, fix a player i, a set of beliefs ∆ * i ⊆ ∆(B −i ) and a type s i . We let
denote the set of bids rationalized for type s i by beliefs in ∆ * i . Observe that ρ i is monotone in its second argument: that is,
Since C −i may be interpreted as a subset of B −i it makes sense to write
The main definitions can now be provided.
Definition 9 An n-tuple of correspondences
Observe that interim ∆-rationalizability is defined via a best-response property, independently of the sets of (∆, k) -rationalizable bids (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994 , Definition 55.1). However, we will show below that the set of interim ∆ -rationalizable bids for type s i can indeed be obtained as the limit of the sets of (∆, k)-rationalizable bids as k → ∞.
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The following remarks are easily derived from Definition 10.
Remark 4 The set of ∆-rationalizable bids for type s i is included in R
∆ i (s i , k) for all k = 1, 2, .... Proof. Let (C 1 , ..., C n ) be an n-tuple of correspondences with the ∆-best-response prop- erty. Trivially, C j (s j ) ⊆ ρ j (s j , ∆ i ∩ ∆(C −i )) ⊆ R + = R ∆ i (s i ; 0) for all j and s j . Suppose that C j (s j ) ⊆ R ∆ j (s j ; k − 1) for all j and s j . Then ∆(C −i ) ⊆ ∆(R ∆ −i (·; k − 1
)). By the best-response property and monotonicity of
) for all i, s i and k, which implies the thesis.
eq n ) (regarded as an n-tuple of correspondences) has the ∆-best-response property.
Rationalizable Bidding with Monotonic Beliefs
We now return to the auction setting of Section 3 and let
To simplify the notation, we omit the superscript ∆ from the set of interim ∆-rationalizable strategies.
We shall provide a full characterization of the set of interim (∆, k) and ∆-rationalizable bids momentarily. However, a direct application of Theorem 6 and Definition 10 is sufficient to compare the predictions of equilibrium analysis and interim ∆-rationalizability.
From now on, we let b eq denote the symmetric equilibrium bidding function of Milgrom and Weber (1982, Theorem 14) . Our assumptions are sufficient to guarantee its existence; moreover, b eq is increasing and satisfies b
Our first result shows that, for every type s i ∈ (0, 1), all bids below the equilibrium, as well as a nonempty interval of bids above it, are interim ∆-rationalizable.
Recall that, for any increasing bound B, φ
is the new bound on best replies obtained by a given upper bound B on beliefs.
Proposition 11
The function φ b eq is increasing, and satisfies:
Proof. By the equilibrium condition b
(1), where the inequalities are strict for s i ∈ (0, 1), and hold as equalities if s i = 1. This proves (1) and (2). Proposition 8 (4) implies that φ b eq is increasing. (3) To prove that every bid in the interval (0, φ b eq (s i )) is interim ∆-rationalizable for s i , we show that the n-tuple of correspondences
(slightly modified for the extreme values s j = 0, 1) has the best-response property:
• for
By (1) and (2)
Now Theorem 6 implies that, for all j and s j ∈ (0, 1), (C 1 , . . . , C n ) has the best-response property.
We now turn to the characterization of interim ∆-rationalizability. For every signal
and hence B(·; k) ≥ B(·; k+1) for all k. Thus, the sequence {B(·; k)} k≥1 is weakly decreasing pointwise, and we can define B(s i ; ∞) = lim k→∞ B(s i ; k) for all s i . The main result of this section can now be stated. ) . Therefore, B(·; k + 1) must also be increasing.
(2) As noted above, the sequence {B(·; k)} k≥1 is weakly pointwise decreasing, and its elements are increasing and positive by Part (1). Hence, its pointwise limit B(·; ∞) is nondecreasing. We first show that it satisfies B(·; ∞) > 0.
As 
Theorem 6 then implies that every bid b * ∈ (0, B(s i ; ∞)) is a best reply to some belief
We prove that the collection of correspondences (s j −→ (0, B(s j ; ∞))) n j=1 (slightly modified for the extreme values s j = 0, 1) has the best-response property: (1) is either one of its interior points, or its right endpoint. φ
Furthermore, note that Proposition 11 implies that b
, and b eq (1) ∈ C k (1); thus, by the equilibrium condition, s j ∈ ρ j (s j ; ∆ j ∩ ∆(C −j ) for s j = 0, 1 as well, and we conclude that C j (s j ) ⊆ ρ j (s j ; ∆ j ∩∆(C −j ) for all s j . Therefore, the collection (C 1 , . . . , C n ) has the best-reply property. This proves that every bid in the interval (0, B(s i ; ∞)) is ∆-rationalizable for type s i .
On the other hand, for every bid b > B(s i ; ∞) there is some k such that b > B(s i ; k) and this implies that b cannot be ∆-rationalizable for s i (see Remark 4).
There are interesting examples of (symmetric) interdependent-values models where (a) signals are independent, and (b) valuations functions are quasi-linear : that is, the valuation function has the form v(
, where υ and κ are nondecreasing and υ > 0. Auctions with independent private values and the "wallet game" (see Klemperer, 1998) belong to this class of models. For such models we find stronger results about rationalizable bids. In particular, the following proposition shows that interim ∆-rationalizability implies substantial shading for high conditional valuations (signals), but is consistent with negligible shading for low conditional valuations (of course, interim ∆-rationalizability is also consistent with extreme shading for all signals, because every positive bid below the equilibrium is interim ∆ -rationalizable for bidders with positive signals). 
Proposition 13
(defined for s i > 0) is positive and nondecreasing; however,
Proof. Fix an increasing bound B. We claim that the value function π * (s i ; B −i ) is increasing and convex in s i .
To see this, note that, by quasi-linearity and independence, 
This completes the proof of the preliminary claim. is concave for each k > 1. Concavity is preserved by taking the pointwise limit. Therefore B(·; ∞) is also concave.
(2) The argument given above also implies that S(s i ; k) = π * (s i ; B −i (·;k−1)) is increasing and convex. Proposition 8 (1) implies that B(0;k − 1) = B(0; k) = E[v i |s i = 0]. Therefore S(0; k) = 0 and S(s i ; k) > 0 for any s i > 0.
(3) Parts (1) and (2) imply that
is positive and nondecreasing. Furthermore, we know that b 
where G denotes the common marginal c.d.f. of the signals. Thus 0 ≤ lim
Results (1)- (3) also hold for k = ∞. In particular, S(s i ; ∞) ≥ S(s i , 2) > 0 for s i > 0. Concavity/convexity and weak monotonicity are preserved by taking the limit k → ∞. As for proportional shading by low types, Lemma 19 in the Appendix and the argument above imply
Private Values
In the previous subsection we analyzed (interim) ∆-rationalizability with ∆ i = ∆
. But we remarked in Section 3 that the restriction to monotonic beliefs is immaterial if the auction game has private values, i.e., if signals and valuations coincide. In particular, Theorem 6 (4) implies that all the results about ∆-rationalizability of the previous subsection also hold for ∆ i = ∆ 
., µ ∈ ∆ i ∩ ∆(R −i (·, k)) if and only if µ ∈ ∆(R
Using Theorem 6 (4), one can easily prove that for every v i > 0 a bid b is weakly dominated for valuation/type v i if and only if b / ∈ (0, v i ).
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We can conclude that the procedure given by in Definition 10 with ∆ + (B −i ) is equivalent to performing one round of elimination of all weakly dominated bids for each type, followed by the iterated elimination, for each type, of bids which are never best responses.
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Therefore, in this case ∆-rationalizability captures the implications of the following assumptions:
(a) every bidder is rational, (b) every bidder is cautious (i.e., she would never choose a weakly dominated bid), (c) there is common certainty of (a) and (b).
Discussion
This section discusses the relationship between our findings and the experimental evidence on first-price auctions, and indicates a number of extensions. To fix ideas, we begin with an overview of our results. Our key analytical tool is a characterization of the best responses for a type to beliefs satisfying certain restrictions. Specifically, if a (risk neutral) rational player i of type s i believes that his opponents are not going to bid above a given, type-dependent least upper bound B, then she can choose any bid in the interval (0, φ
is thus the new least upper bound derived from B.
We then use this result to obtain an iterative characterization of interim rationalizable bids. The upper bound obtained in the first step of the algorithm is B(s i , 1) = E(v i |s i ), where E(v i |s i ) is the conditional valuation of the good for type s i . In subsequent steps k = 2, 3..., we apply our characterization result and derive an upper bound B(s i ; k) = φ B(·;k−1)
(s i ) from the previous upper bound B(·; k − 1). (Of course, B(s
.) The set of interim rationalizable bids for type s i is an interval with interior (0, lim k→∞ B (s i ; k) ). This provides a relatively simple implementation of interim rationalizability.
We show that the upper bound on interim rationalizable bids is nondecreasing and strictly above the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if signals are independent and valuation functions quasi-linear (e.g., in auctions with independent private values), this upper bound is concave, implying substantial proportional shading for high types.
Our analysis has implications for revenue comparisons in auctions with independent private values and risk-neutral bidders. We rely on a form of "cautiousness" that rules out weakly dominated bids. In second -price auctions, this implies that players will bid their valuation, so that rationalizable bids coincide with equibrium bids. On the other hand, rationalizable expected revenues in a first-price auction can be lower or higher than equilibrium expected revenues. By the equilibrium revenue equivalence result, rationalizable expected revenues in a first-price auction can be lower or higher than in a second-price auction.
Perhaps more interestingly, rationalizable expected revenues in a first-price auction can be arbitrarily close to zero, and will always be lower than they would be if players were to bid their valuation. Observe that, with independent private values, as the number of bidders grows, the first-price equilibrium bid function approaches the identity function, implying that the same must hold for the upper bound on rationalizable bids. Thus, in rough, intuitive terms, in the limit, revenue equivalence obtains only in the "best scenario" (from the point of view of the seller) where players bid close to their upper bound.
Experiments and Deviations From the Risk-Neutral Nash Equilibrium
There are (at least) three "stylized facts" emerging from the experimental studies on firstprice auctions with independent private values, which we find relevant in relation to our theoretical analysis:
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Overbidding. A large majority of subjects show a persistent tendency to bid above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE).
Decreasing Proportional Deviations. Deviations from RNNE are proportionally larger for subjects with smaller valuations; in other words, the ratio |actual bid-RNNE bid| valuation is negatively correlated with subjects' private valuations.
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Heterogeneity. Bidding behavior is heterogeneous across subjects.
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In a series of papers, Cox, Smith and Walker try to explain the data with a family of models featuring bidders with heterogeneous degrees of (constant relative) risk aversion. In such models, equilibrium bidding functions are linear (like the RNNE function) except for the largest valuations, but have heterogenous slopes and are steeper than the RNNE (e.g. Cox et al., 1988 Cox et al., , 1992 . The risk-aversion explanation of Overbidding is controversial. In particular, it leaves Decreasing Proportional Deviations largely unexplained. Furthermore, it is at odds with experimental findings concerning different auction settings.
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We believe that our paper sheds light on a different explanation of these experimental findings: different subjects have different beliefs about the bidding behavior of their competitors, and the limited feedback they get from the outcomes of previous auctions prevents them from approaching the equilibrium sufficiently fast (e.g. Friedman, 1992) . But even if subjects do not hold equilibrium beliefs, they may be sophisticated enough to take into account that their competitors' behavior satisfies some rationality restrictions and, possibly, that also their opponents' beliefs conform to analogous assumptions. Our paper identifies the least upper bound on bids of strategically sophisticated, risk-neutral bidders with heterogenous beliefs. Since the upper bound is above the (linear) RNNE and concave, Overbidding and Decreasing Proportional Deviations are qualitatively consistent with risk-neutrality and (a degree of) strategic sophistication.
We regard non-equilibrium (but strategically sophisticated) bidding as a complementary explanation of experimental findings, which can be integrated with risk-aversion. In Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2000) we show how risk-aversion can be incorporated into our analysis.
Experimental evidence suggests a number of extensions to our results. First, our analysis so far does not offer an explanation of the asymmetry in subjects' deviations from RNNE (i.e. the tendency to bid above the RNNE), nor does it explain why very small bids are so rare for subjects with intermediate or high valuations. Second, it may be argued that rational bidders should form their beliefs about the competitors and make plans before they are told their valuation, and therefore ex ante rationalizability is a more appropriate solution concept in this context.
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Third, in most experimental settings there is an (explicit or implicit) minimum bid increment. We discuss these issues in the following subsection.
23 In third-price auctions, risk aversion implies bidding below the RNNE, whereas experiments show significant bidding above the RNNE (Kagel and Levin, 1993) . Other partial explanations of Overbidding involve (i) psychological biases related to frame effects and the complexity of the decision problem (e.g. Kagel, 1995, Section I.B) , and (ii) lack of experimental control on subjects incentives due to a small expected cost of deviations from the optimal bid (Harrison, 1989) . Section I.G in Kagel (1995) provides a discussion of the debate about the risk-aversion explanation. Kagel and Roth (1992) presents Decreasing Proportional Deviations as one of the empirical findings at odds with the constant relative risk aversion model. A recent experimental paper by Goeree et al. (2000) provides support for the risk-aversion explanation.
24 Which solution concept (interim or ex ante) is more appropriate depends on our interpretation of the formal asymmetric-information model. If it represents a situation with genuine incomplete information without an ex ante stage, then interim rationalizability is appropriate. If it represents a situation where the bidders really obtain information about the outcome of a chance move, then ex ante rationalizability may be more appropriate. Experimental games fall in the second category.
Some extensions and related results
Unknown distribution of signals. We have derived our results under the assumption that the distribution of signals F is common knowledge. However, similar results can be obtained under more general assumptions. For the sake of simplicity, we discuss here the (symmetric) IPV case with two bidders.
Suppose that the true c.d.f. F is not known, but it is common knowledge that the valuation of a generic bidder is distributed according to some continuous density f bounded below by a strictly positive continuous function g :
Suppose that bidder i believes that her competitor −i will not bid above a given increasing upper bound B > 0 (e.g. B(v) = v). Adapting the proof of Theorem 6, we can show that the new least upper bound on bids derived from B is
where G * is the "pessimistic" c.d.f. that assigns probability mass 1 − 1 0 g(w)dw to the highest type v −i = 1 and probability v v g(w)dw to any interval [v , v ] with v < 1 (G * can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of continuously differentiable c.d.f.'s F n such that
Our qualitative results on bounds continue to hold in this setting. Of course, the upper bounds we find will be higher than in the model where a density f (with f (v) ≥ g (v) ) is common knowledge: since more beliefs are allowed, more bids are rationalizable. 
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Lower Bounds. Theorem 12 shows that imposing successively higher-order mutual belief in the assumption that players are rational (and that positive bids win with positive probability) yields a decreasing sequence of least upper bounds B(·; k) on the set of best replies for every bidder type. However, arbitrarily small but positive bids are interim rationalizable.
In view of the experimental findings mentioned above, it may be interesting to exogenously specify a lower bound L ∈ B −i to players' bids, and investigate the consequences of the further assumption that (it is mutual belief that) players do not expect their opponents to bid below L. A preliminary analysis may be found in Appendix 6.2.2 of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2000) . It is shown that the upper bounds obtained with this modified solution procedure are similar to those found here.
Ex-Ante Rationalizability. Our analysis of interim rationalizability provides an upper bound on ex-ante rationalizable bidding functions, but we are not able to show the upper bound is tight. However, some of our qualitative results also hold for ex ante rationalizability. In particular, we can show that the analog of Proposition 11 continues to hold: the upper bound on rationalizable bids is strictly above the RNNE and every positive bid below this upper bound is rationalizable (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2000, p.24) .
Discrete Bids. In most experimental settings, bids are discrete because there is a (possibly only implicit) minimum increment δ (e.g., a cent), so that the set of bids is {0, δ, 2δ, ..., kδ, (k+  1)δ) , ...}. Our analysis of rationalizable bids provides an acceptable approximation if the number of players is not very large and δ is small. This appears to be the case in most experiments, as well as in many real-life situations. Dekel and Wolinski (2000) analyze the opposite case (a large population of players and a non-negligible minimum increment) in an IPV setting. They identify a nondecreasing lower bound to the set of rationalizable bids and show that, for any fixed minimum increment δ, as the number of bidders n gets large, this lower bound approaches the equilibrium bidding function. Thus, rationalizability and equilibrium roughly coincide in large IPV auctions with a non-negligible minimum increment on bids.
Asymmetries. The approach presented in this paper may be extended to environments where players are not symmetric, i.e. Assumptions 1 and 2 are violated. This is carried out in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2000) . Theorem 6 and Proposition 8 are easily extended, but the upper bounds on k-rationalizable bids may be flat at the top.
Appendix

Derivation and Properties of Bounds
We begin by introducing additional notation used in the proofs. Let N = {1, . .., n} denote the set of players. For any subset of players J ⊆ N , let S J = j∈J S j , and for simplicity define S N \{i} = S −i . A generic element of S J is denoted s J . For any partition {K, L} of the set of players J and any Events related to the signals of players in set J are represented by means of square brackets with an index J specifying that we refer to a subset of S J . For example, let K ⊆ J;
Notation
Sets of bidders and signals.
When J = N \{i} we suppress the index, as S −i is the basic space of uncertainty from the point of view of Bidder i. Thus, for example,
Expected payoff. Taking the possibility of ties into account, the expected payoff of bidding b given signal s i and belief µ ∈ ∆(B −i ) is
It is convenient to define a modified version of the expected payoff function for a bidder with nondecreasing conjectures, which may assign positive probability to ties. For any tuple {B j } j =i of (nondecreasing) real-valued functions on [0, 1], definē
To avoid repeating tedious qualifications, for every random variable h and event F , if
If the game has private values, the above function takes up a particularly simple form. We define modified payoffs for arbitrary beliefs µ ∈ ∆(B −i ). Border, 1994, p.323) and the observation that the probability of ties vanishes as 
If the subsequence is itself monotonic, then L ≤π(b, s i ; B −i ) by the above arguments. Otherwise, it must contain a monotonic sub-subsequence {b
Finally, to prove the last claim note that if
In a private-values setting, the relationship between the payoff function π and the modified payoff functionπ is even closer.
Lemma 15 Assume the game has private values. Then, for every signal
Proof. The first claim is obvious upon inspecting Equations (8) (b, s i ; µ) . This establishes the second claim.
We state another preliminary lemma, which verifies that the conjecture B −i is "more pessimistic" than any belief µ ∈ ∆ 
Proof. The claims pertaining to the private-values case are simple to establish, and illustrate the basic ideas.
(1-PV) For any bid b and conjecture 
Under our monotonicity and affiliation assumptions, the same basic ideas generalize to the interdependent-values setting. We first illustrate the argument by proving Claim (1) for the case of a single competitor −i = j and continuous, increasing conjectures B j , b j ; thus, there are no positive-probability ties:π(·, s i , b j ) = π(·, s i , b j ), and similarly for B j . Note that
Since Pr[B = b|s i ] = 0, the first term in the r.h.s. equals π(b, (1) It is enough to prove the claim for a belief µ concentrated on a single profile
Since Pr[B 
As above, Remark 2 implies that, for any nonempty
which proves the claim. 
That is, for every α ∈ (0, 1], the graph of σ(·, α) is the piecewise linear function joining the origin with the point (α, 1 − α), and the latter with the point (1, 1). Each function σ(·, α) is continuous and differentiable everywhere except at x = α. Its inverse τ : 
In conjunction with Lemma 16, the following Lemma implies that sup b≥0π (b, s i ; B −i ) is the least upper bound Bidder i may obtain by best-responding to beliefs in ∆ 
is increasing for every k, it follows that, for every k, the set 
By the Dominated Convergence theorem, this yields 
Since the reverse inequality follows from Lemma 16, (3), the proof is complete.
Theorem 6
We are finally able to prove the main result of Section 3, Theorem 6. The key step is the proof of Claim (2). We sketch the main argument here (see also the discussion in Section 2.
For any bid b * < φ B −i (s i ), the justifying belief g
−i has the qualitative features illustrated in Figure 1 . Specifically, g (α) is increasing and lies below B; moreover, it approximates the upper bound B up to the points where the latter crosses the bid b * , and approximates b * thereafter.
To verify the optimality of b * given g 
the first equality appears in Part (3) of the Theorem, the first inequality reflects the fact that M −i ⊂ B −i , and the second inequality is Claim (3-PV) in Lemma 16. Also, Lemma 15 states that max b≥0π (b, s i ; B −i ) = π * (s i ; B −i ). Thus, (4) holds. To see that (1) holds, observe that, by Remark 3, for any 
which yields the type (of Player j) who bids b(λ, α), according to the bid function g (α) , if B is right-continuous ats. 
has a unique maximum at λ = 1 for sufficiently small α. 
